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The relationship between inequality and redistribution is usually studied under the assumption 
that the government collects different amounts of taxes from each citizen (voter) but gives 
back the same amount (in cash or in kind) to everyone. In this paper we consider what 
happens if the government can redistribute through both sides of its budget (revenue and 
expenditure). We show that inequality may have no discernible effect on the size of 
redistributive programs.  
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1. Introduction 
Following the influential contributions of Meltzer and Richard (1981), Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), the conventional wisdom is that higher income 
inequality among voters leads to increased government redistribution. The intuition behind 
this result is that the greater is the gap between median and mean income, the higher will be 
the level of spending preferred by the median income voter and – since political competition 
drives policy decisions toward the ideal point of the median income voter – the higher will be 
the equilibrium amount of redistribution. Nevertheless, despite some empirical evidence in 
support of this hypothesis (see, Meltzer and Richard (1983), Milanovic (2000)), other 
empirical studies have not found that higher income inequality among voters leads to an 
increase in the size of redistributive programs (see, for example, Perotti (1996) and 
Rodriguez (1999)). This has led some (e.g., Benabou (1996) and Rodriguez (1999)) to urge 
the profession to take seriously the need to relax median voter assumptions in order to gain 
an understanding in variations in redistributive activity across countries and over time.  
 
Political scientists have long argued that unadulterated, fully participatory, median-voter 
democracy describes no actual political system – rather, the translation of resources into 
influence occurs in highly institutionalized environments that amplify some voices and mute 
others. Although we do not want to dispute the validity of this claim, in this paper we show 
that, in a median-voter framework, the relationship between inequality and redistribution is 
not always positive once we take into account that redistribution is often effected through the 
public provision of private goods
1. For this purpose we construct a model in which the 
government uses the tax proceeds to finance the provision of a rival public good which is 
                                                 
1 Other papers showing that there is not, necessarily, a divergence between theory  (based on the median-voter 
framework) and empirical evidence include Lee and Roemer (1999), Benabou (2000) and Alesina, Glaeser and 
Sacerdote (2001). 
  1also provided by the private sector, albeit at different quality levels – a vertically 
differentiated product (VDP) like health or education. Households are assumed to derive 
utility from the consumption of the VDP (either of the variety freely provided by the 
government or of one of the varieties offered by the private sector) and of a privately 
produced homogeneous product. We assume that both goods are rival in consumption. This 
implies that if a higher proportion of households decide to “consume” the publicly provided 
variety, the quality provided by the public sector must decline. Thus, although for a given 
level of public consumption the median voter would have chosen to vote for a higher tax rate 
in response to higher income inequality, a rise in the tax rate may induce a larger number of 
the more wealthy households to consume the publicly provided variety (since their after-tax 
income declines). Consequently, the rise in the tax rate may leave the median voter with 
lower after-tax income without a corresponding rise in the quality of the publicly-provided 
variety. As a result, the median voter may not prefer a rise in the tax rate as inequality 
increases. 
  
2. The Model 
We construct the simplest possible model capable of illustrating the main idea of the paper.   
To this end, consider a closed economy which produces and consumes two goods (X and Y) 
with the use of labour. We assume that perfect competition prevails in all markets and that all 
households (citizens-cum-voters) are endowed with one unit of labor, which they offer 
inelastically. There are, however, differences in skill between households, which are 
reflected in differences in the endowment of each household’s effective labor supply. This is 
in turn reflected in differences in income across households. We assume that firms pay the 
same wage rate per effective unit of labor –thus the distribution of talent across firms does 
  2not affect unit production costs.  We will assume that the politico-economic equilibrium is 
determined according to the Downsian model of electoral competition.  
  a. Firms 
Good X is a homogeneous good produced only by private sector firms under linear 
technology, 
          X L = ,                                                                                                                       (1) 
where stands for the effective units of labour used. Using labour as the numeraire, we get 
that the price of good
L
X ,  X p , is unity.  
 
Good  is a vertically differentiated good (VDP) which is produced at various quality levels 
in both the private and the public sector. We wish to capture the fact that, for many 
government-provided goods (or services), some citizens choose not to “consume” them (even 
though they are eligible for doing so and there is no price-tag attached to them), preferring 
instead to purchase them from the private sector. Typical examples of such publicly provided 
goods are health care, childcare, old-age care and education. One reason for this phenomenon 
is that these goods are vertically differentiated according to quality (thus displaying large 
income elasticity) and there is a large degree of lumpiness associated with their consumption. 
For example, it is nearly impossible for a student to attend at the same time a public and a 
private educational institution (or to attend both part-time thus achieving a full-time status), 
or for a patient to have part of a heart operation at a public hospital and the rest of the 
operation at a private one. Moreover, in many cases it confers no extra utility (or it is 
detrimental) to supplement publicly provided goods with privately provided ones (i.e., first 
having an operation at a public hospital and afterwards supplementing it with another 
operation at a private hospital). Wealthy households will often elect to pay in order to avail 
Y
  3themselves of the highest quality of these services – rather than be satisfied with the 
(sometimes) mediocre quality offered by the public sector.  
 
We assume that quality is measured by an index  , and that there is complete 
information regarding the quality index. We further assume that average costs depend on 
quality and that, for any given quality level, the average cost is independent of the number of 
units produced. These assumptions are captured by the following production function, 
0 Q >
/ Q YL = Q .                                                                                                                           (2)   
In equation (2),  Y   denotes the number of units of quality   produced. This particular 
specification implies that as quality increases more (effective) units of labour are required to 
produce each unit of the  good.  It also implies that the (average cost) and price at which 
each variety of the good will be offered is 
Q Q
Y
() PQ Q = .                                                                                                                           (3) 
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the public sector uses the same 
technology to produce the good, and pays the same wage rate.  
b. Households 
All households are assumed to have identical preferences. Following Flam and 
Helpman (1987), we assume that the homogeneous good is divisible, whereas the quality-
differentiated product is indivisible and households can consume only one unit of it.  For 
simplicity - and with some loss of generality -  we write the utility function as 
ln ii UQ X =+ i  
where  i X  and Q stand for the quantity of the homogeneous good  and the quality of good 
(the VDP) consumed by household  . In addition to simplicity, this quasi-linear utility 
function has the advantage that it generates a prediction that the size of the public sector 
i
Y i
  4evolves according to Wagner’s Law (i.e. the share of government spending in GNP is 
positively related to per-capita GNP).  Moreover, we have verified that the results obtained in 
this paper can be generated by other utility functions (for example, UQ
1 [/ ( 1 ) ] X
π γπ
− =+ − ).  
Let   stand for household’s   endowment of effective number of labour units. Since the 
wage rate per effective units of labour is unity,  also stands for household income. We 







, with Pareto distributed incomes. 
The Pareto distribution is defined over the interval e , and its CDF is  
          .                                                                                            (4)  ( ) 1 ( / ) , 1
a Fe be a =− >
Parameter   stands for the lowest income, and parameter  determines the shape of the 
distribution (higher values of  imply greater equality). The Pareto distribution, in addition to 
being easy to work with, is a good approximation of actual income distributions. Empirical 
estimates of the value of   range between 1.5 and 3.0 (see, Creedy (1977)). The mean of the 




          /( 1) ab a µ =− ,                                                                                                        (5a) 
and the income of the median voter (household) is 
          .                                                                                                              (5b)  1/ 2 a m = b
i i X
(1 ) ii et X −=
Since good Y is also offered by the public sector, and households can consume either a 
privately-provided variety or the (single) variety provided by the government, in effect 
households face two mutually exclusive budget constraints. The budget constraint of a 
household deciding to acquire a variety of Y which is offered by the private sector is 
         ,  (1 ) () ii X t eP Q P X Q − =+= +
whereas, if the household chooses to consume the publicly (and freely) provided variety the 
budget constraint is, 
        , 
  5where   stands for the income tax rate. Let Q stand for the quality of good Y provided by 
the public sector. Then, if the household consumes a privately provided variety, the utility 
maximizing demands for  Q and 
t
 are (we assume that for all households income is high 
enough to generate positive demand for both goods), 
G
X
(1 ) 1 ii Qe t =− −                                                                                                (6) 
1 i X = ,                                                                                                                             (7)                                  
whereas if the household consumes the publicly provided variety, the entire disposable 
income of the household ( ) is spent on (1 ) i et =− X .             
The resulting indirect utility of the household in the two cases is then, 
(1 ) 1
P
ii Vet =− − ,            if it chooses a privately-offered variety,                                   (8)                          
ln( (1 ))
GG
ii VQ et =+ − ,  if it consumes the publicly-offered variety.                              (9) 
We note that the difference between 
P
i V and  is increasing in income ( ).  Thus, only 
households with large incomes will be willing to pass by the possibility of consuming for 
free the publicly provided variety and instead pay to acquire their preferred variety from the 
private sector. Let  denote the income of a household that is indifferent between consuming 
the publicly provided variety and its optimally chosen privately produced variety, i.e., for this 




(1 ) 1 ln( (1 ))
P G Vt Q t θθ =− − =+ − =
G V .                                                                        (10) 
We term θ  the dividing level of income (ability). From the Pareto distribution we know that 
the proportion of households with incomes smaller or equal to θ  (that is, the proportion of 
households which choose to consume the publicly provided variety) is 
() 1(/)
a Fb θ θ =− . 
Assuming that the government budget is kept in balance, we have that  
  61(/)
a tb µθ  =− 
G Q  
G
a
 .                                                                                                      (11)    
In equation (11) the left-hand-side stands for tax revenue and the right-hand-side for the cost 
of providing the Y good at quality Q to all those wishing to consume it. Thus, the 
relationship between the tax rate and  depends on how many households consume the 
publicly provided variety.  Rewriting equation (11) we get that 
G Q
/( 1)(1 ( / ) )
G Qt b a a b θ =− −  .                                                                                          (12) 
3. Median-voter equilibrium 
In what follows we concentrate on the median voter (it can be easily established that all the 
conditions required for the median-voter theorem to apply are satisfied). In the politico-
economic equilibrium considered in this paper, the prevailing tax rate implemented by the 
policy maker is the one that maximizes the utility of the median voter.  
 Substituting equation (12) into equations (8) and (9) and using equation (5b), we get that 
1/ 2( 1) 1 Pa
m Vb t =− −                                                                                                       (13) 
1/ ln( 2 (1 ))







a b t −
G
m
                                                
 .                                                              (14) 
Evidently, the median voter will not decide on a positive tax rate if at this tax rate she 
chooses to consume a privately provided variety (since in such a case would consent to a 
drop to her disposable income without the benefit of consuming the publicly provided 
variety)
2. Thus, if the tax rate preferred by the median voter is positive, we find from 
equation (14) that the maximum value of V  is attained if the tax rate is
3, 
 
2 The implication of this is that the household which will be indifferent between a privately offered and the publicly offered 
variety will have higher income than the median voter ( θ >m).   
3 The second order condition is satisfied. Note also that in order for this tax rate to be the median voter’s optimal choice it 
must also be the case that the utility it confers to the median voter is higher than that which the median voter would attain at 
a zero tax rate, i.e., *
* 1/ 1/
,0 , 1l n ( 2 ( 1 ) ) 2 1
(1 ) ( 1 ( / ) )
Ga
mt a mt
ba b t b
ab θ
= =− + − > −
−−
a
a P V = V   .   
This is the case for empirically relevant values of  .                 
  7* (1 ) ( 1 ( / ) ) / 1{
a ab t θ −− =−
(/) )
a b
} b a .                                                                              (15)  
We note from equation (15) that the median voter’s preferred tax rate ( ) decreases if - 






 increases. But, of course, the proportion of households that consume 
the publicly provided variety itself depends on the ruling tax rate (which is the one preferred 
by the median voter); a higher t  leaves households with lower disposable income thus 
inducing some of them to switch from consuming a privately supplied variety to the publicly 
supplied.  From equation (10) and using equations (12) and (15) we get another relationship 
between t and the dividing level of income (θ ), 







                                                                           (16) 
Equations (15) and (16) jointly allow the median voter to determine   (and ).  Since we are 
interested in the effects of mean-preserving changes in income distribution on t , we 
consider the effects of changes in the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution (a) that keep 
average income (=
*
) constant.  An increase in   (which also results in a decline in the ratio 
of mean to median income, and is therefore inequality reducing), must thus be paired with an 
increase in parameter b in order for   to remain constant. As the reader can easily verify the 
comparative statics effects of changes in   on   are ambiguous. After extensive 
experimentation with empirically relevant parameter values (which also satisfy the condition 
expressed in footnote 1), we find that changes in inequality exert (practically) no effect on t . 
Figure 1 displays the median voter’s preferred tax rates (size of government) as a function of 
inequality and  for three different values of average income (
*
= 2.0, 2.5, 3.0 - black, red  
and green schedules, respectively).   
 
 

















Figure 1: Government size and inequality 
 
 
The explanation for this result relies on the fact that a rise in the tax rate in response to an 
increase in inequality implies the combination of two effects. The first one is the traditional 
effect identified in the literature which leads to an increase in the tax rate preferred by the 
median voter as the gap between mean and median (pre-tax) income increases – since the 
median voter expects that a rise in the tax rate will bring to her a greater increase in public 
goods provision than before. But in addition to this, a higher tax rate will induce some high-
income households to switch their demand from a privately supplied variety to the publicly 
supplied. Accordingly, the government may not be able to use the increased tax revenue to 
produce a variety of higher quality, as it will have to provide the good to a higher number of 
households. It is thus by no means certain that a higher tax rate will procure the median voter 
(and everyone else) a higher quality of the public good. Our numerical results show that the 
two effects mentioned tend to cancel each other, producing a non-monotonic and rather 
insignificant effect of inequality on the tax rate (size of government). 
4. Conclusion   
 In this paper we consider what happens if the government can redistribute through both sides 
of its budget (revenue and expenditure). We model this by introducing the possibility that 
high-income individuals may decide not to “consume” what the government is offering as a 
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public good to all citizens. We find that changes in inequality may have no discernible effect 
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